China’s USV designs are becoming increasingly ambitious. How did they get here, and what are the likely ways China will employ its unmanned fleet? Recent designs show some clues to the likely way forward.
When the world’s largest known military unmanned surface vehicle (USV) was revealed to the world, it was a remarkable moment that resonated beyond the few experts following the technological and military developments in East Asia. The JARI USV-A ‘Orca’ seems a sophisticated trimaran whose line could be compared with classy luxury yachts to the point that it was used as an attraction. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are regularly used by China’s policy makers to showcase the impressive advance of Chinese technologies, even in comparison to the West.
Despite a lack of historical depth in several available analyses, China’s development of maritime uncrewed systems (MUS) is not new and, indeed, it goes back to five decades of scientific and military experimentation. How advanced is it? Where is it headed?
The Chinese leadership’s stated commitment to developing a blue-water navy and integrating high-technology unmanned systems is clearly reflected in USV development. These efforts indicate strategic expansion of maritime reach, while leveraging technological innovation to enhance naval capabilities. This shift aligns with a military doctrine stated across the last three decades and advances the constant integration of autonomous technology within the battlespace as a viable replacement for assets currently unavailable to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
As China is clearly more interested in finding a solution for the lack of readiness as they transition from a green-water to blue-water navy, firms and state-led projects are addressing a different need when facing the US Navy or Taiwanese presence in green and blue waters. For the former, the problem is not denying access to areas closer to the shores or ports but how to combat the US Navy in the deep ocean. Ideally, that is where China would like to develop an advantage over the US Navy.
The first known Chinese USV is the Type 312 ‘Futi’, a remote-controlled minesweeper developed in the late 1960s and employed in 1972 to clear US mines in Vietnam. As the first effectively used remoted-controlled boat, the Futi is an interesting first case. The hybrid-controlled system allowed both remote control up to 5 km, or manned control by a crew of three sailors. Double control was one of the features that remained across certain types of more recent drones.
However, the first ‘modern’ Chinese USV was the TianXiang-1, built by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and related subsidiaries enterprises. CASIC has been sanctioned by the United States Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) since November 2020. The 6.5 m long USV was tested in July 2008 and employed at the 2008 Beijing Olympics (see Figure 2).
In 2013, the Research Institute of Unmanned Surface Vehicles Engineering at Shanghai University launched the Jinghai 1, which “[…] patrolled the South China Sea with the China Maritime Affairs Commission’s 166 patrol vessel, surveying the waters there, marking the first use of a Chinese unmanned boat in the region” according to Chinese journal World Science. Various enhanced versions have since been employed. In 2014 the Hai Teng 01, designed for oil spill response in hazardous conditions, was launched by the Shanghai Maritime University’s Marine Technology & Control Engineering Key Laboratory. That same year witnessed the first voyage of the Sea Ray wave glider USV developed under the state-sponsored ‘863 programme’ of the 12th Five-Year Plan National High Technology Research and Development Programme.
The High-Speed Intercept Boat (HSIB), unveiled at the Defence Services Asia (DSA) 2016 exhibition in Kuala Lumpur, is considered the first Chinese USV designed for explicit military use. Jointly developed by Poly Technologies, a state-owned defence firm affiliated with China Poly Group and sanctioned by the US (2024) and EU (2025) for apparently providing components for military helicopters to Russian companies. The HSIB is reportedly 13 m long, with a beam of 4 m, and a draft of 0.6 m; fitted with twin 850 hp engines, it is capable of attaining a top speed of 148 km/h (80 kn) and has a range of 370 km (200 nautical miles). It can be armed with two 7.62 mm general-purpose machine guns (GPMGs) or one 12.7 mm heavy machine gun (HMG), and possibly missiles in the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) weight class.
In the same period, several similar platforms emerged. The SeaFly-01 by Beijing Sifang Automation debuted at the Zhuhai Airshow 2016. The USV-focused civilian firm Yunzhou Tech presented the L30 and the L80 a few years later at the Zhuhai Airshow 2018. Poly Technologies also revealed the Dolphin and Nezha USV families at DSA 2018. These models remained relatively limited in size and payload.
A partial shift came with the presentation of four USV designs: the B850, A1150, C1500, and D3000 Oceanic Combat Vessel (in the D3000A fleet defence and the D3000B surface combat role versions). Some of these models were revealed during the China Ocean Science and Technology Exhibition in Qingdao in September 2017. An important role was played by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), China’s leading state-owned space and missile firm, sanctioned by the US OFAC in November 2020. According to open sources, several designs did not progress beyond the prototype stage.
In September 2018, at the Africa Aerospace and Defence Exhibition, China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Company (CSOC) presented the ‘JARI’, not to be confused with the bigger ‘JARI-USV-A’ developed later (see below). CSOC is the export arm of Chinese shipbuilding group China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), a state-owned enterprise responsible for the research, design, and construction of military and civilian vessels in China, that merged with CSSC in 2019. CSSC is the largest Chinese state-owned shipbuilder, producing both commercial and advanced military vessels. It was sanctioned by OFAC in November 2020.
The JARI was reported to feature a sensor suite comprising an optoelectronic suite, four fixed active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar panels, and a sonar suite, with the latter an option if configuring the USV for the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role. The USV’s armament comprised a 30 mm automatic cannon, along with a pod for ATGM-class missiles or unguided rockets, and two four-cell vertical launch systems (VLSs) for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); additionally, two torpedo launch tubes were offered as an option for the ASW mission.
In the early 2020s, attention shifted to alternative USV types with different operational roles. During the Zhuhai Airshow 2021 a scale model of a drone carrier USV was displayed, known as the ‘Fighting Shark No.1’. The vessel was understood to have been designed by CASIC, and was reportedly launched in May 2021. It takes the form a catamaran with helipads for five helicopter-type UAVs. Large radomes on its superstructure are likely to include sophisticated communications systems for controlling multiple drones (see Figure 3). Its configuration suggests roles in command and control (C2), communications relay, and electronic warfare (EW). It is unclear whether this USV was ever commissioned but it could have been the basis for another more recent evolution in 2024.
In 2022 the Zhu Hai Yun was launched as drone mothership developed by CSIC, 701st Research Institute. The ship is 88.5 m long and can reportedly transport several types of unmanned platform, including unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), USVs, and UAVs (see Figure 4). Though officially scientific, the Zhu Hai Yun reportedly may perform several military tasks. It circumnavigated Taiwan in 2023, and entered the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 2025.
At the NAVDEX 2023 exhibition in Abu Dhabi, CSSC presented the model of a new multipurpose trimaran USV labelled JARI-USV-A. Satellite images from September 2024 showed an operational version of the vessel docked at Longxue Island’s Guangzhou Shipyard.
The JARI USV-A ‘Orca’ was officially revealed at the Zhuhai Airshow 2024. The trimaran has a displacement of 500 tonnes, and measures 58 m in length, with a beam of 23 m, making the Orca is the world’s largest known military USV. The vessel reaches speeds of 74 km/h (40 kn) and has an operational range of over 7408 km (4,000 nautical miles). In terms of sensors, it mounts numerous fixed-panel AESA radars, understood to also provide electronic warfare (EW) and electronic support measure (ESM) capabilities, along with a rotating navigation radar, an optoelectronic suite, and also understood to include a sonar suite.
In terms of armament, it is provided with a four-cell HT-1 VLS that can be equipped with various missiles, and a flight deck capable of hosting rotary-wing UAVs or conventional helicopters. The vessel may also be capable of hosting USVs. Torpedo tubes were shown on the scale model but their presence on the real vessel was not confirmed.
The only Chinese USV appearing to match the JARI USV-A Orca’s ambition and scale is the A2000 ‘Thunderer’ trimaran USV, a scale model of which was presented by CSSC at the 2024 World Defence Show in Riyadh. The vessel has a displacement of 280 tonnes, and reaches 45 m in length. Alongside a four-panel AESA radar, its sensor suite includes a navigation radar and optoelectronic suite. Its armaments include a medium-calibre cannon, an eight-cell VLS, and two small 24-cell launchers in the vessel sides, purportedly for launching loitering munitions.
Most current Chinese USV designs are for export or developmental prototypes, requiring future evaluation for strategic development. China’s USV deployment in actual combat is unproven and thus potential tactics will be heavily reliant on the designs produced by Chinese firms. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that developing conflicts drive accelerated technological improvements, impossible to replicate through typical testing.
As such, Chinese firms lack battle-tested USVs, having not faced the combat pressures experienced by Ukraine or Russia. This reality leads to two strategic scenarios for USVs: expanding the capabilities of existing platforms (such as, aircraft carriers, destroyers), or developing independent platforms which could supplement naval squadrons in blue-water operations.
The first option, expanding the capabilities of existing platforms, is based on what can be seen by the Chinese exercises and military buildup overall. China is significantly invested in creating a blue-water navy and it is not slowing down productivity. This would require communication between firms to determine overlapping opportunities for development and current liabilities which could be addressed with USV support. However, this method still presents issues in training sailors and fighter pilots. Many personnel have not been trained in unmanned technologies and would either need to be brought up to speed, or an entirely new service branch would require serious consideration.
Alternatively, it is possible that in future the PLAN will employ USVs to form and operate fully autonomous and independent formations. Similar to manned surface action groups, these formations could be composed only of multirole USVs, or strike groups with drone carriers at their core. For Chinese naval applications, an immediate flaw would be the need to develop new command centres to effectively use these systems in blue-water operations. Recent development of artificial islands by the PRC seems to suggest that development of these command centres, where pilots would be able to effectively control USVs, is plausible.
The true breadth and effectiveness of this technology in relation to China’s plans for ‘intelligentised’ warfare likely remains unknown. What is clear from analysing the current state of publicly available information on this technology is that the Chinese navy has prepared a robust arsenal of drone technology to both support its current naval force and independently expand its power.
