Over recent weeks the UK MoD has been questioned on its delayed Defence Investment Plan and how it is structured to address a growing threat from Russia and strategic challenges in the Gulf. Its responses do not instil confidence.
One of the major methods that the UK government has of providing oversight of its various departments is through the Parliamentary Committee process. In an oral evidence committee meeting, specific members of a government department are called together to face questions pertaining to the specific aim of the meeting.
In theory, such a process should work well, but the efficiency and level of interrogation depends on the knowledge of the individual members of the committee, while obfuscation, the ability to avoid questions, platitudes and a general tactic of leading committee members away from the central crux of the question are all tools deployed by departmental members.
On 17 and 23 March 2026 the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) was called to two oral evidence meetings by the Defence Committee and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) respectively. By way of background, like many European nations the UK is suffering from a lack of funding for defence. The reason for this is that the UK continues to prioritise spending on welfare and the national health service. Historically, defence spending was considered a low priority in terms of public support, but given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, US President Donald Trump’s vitriol directed at NATO and the current conflict in the Gulf region, defence investment has stirred public interest.
Both the Defence Committee and PAC oral evidence sessions centred on the MoD’s Annual Report and Accounts for 2024-25, which were published last November. Far from focusing purely on accounts, both meetings touched on a range of topics, including the delay to the publication of the Defence Investment Plan (DIP), the way that military equipment is procured, recruitment and retention, and the continuing saga in relation to the Ajax armoured fighting vehicle.
Both sessions featured some key MoD players. Jeremy Pocklington, the MoD’s Permanent Secretary, National Armament Director (NAD) Rupert Pearce, Aneen Blackmore, who is the MoD’s Director General Finance, and Air Marshal Tim Jones, who is the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Force Development), were all under the spotlight for the Defence Committee meeting. They were joined by Lieutenant General Anna-Lee Reilly, Director Strategic Capability, Engagement and Operations at the MoD’s Defence Equipment & Services (DE&S) organisation, for the PAC meeting on 23 March.
Following his welcome to the MoD personnel during the first meeting on 17 March, the formidable and highly knowledgeable Chair of the Defence Committee, Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi, asked Pocklington for his thoughts on the MoD, having been in post for the past three months.
After Pocklington heaped praise on the military and the staff, drew the Defence Committee’s attention to the technologically changing face of warfare and how last June’s Strategic Defence Review had set the scene for the future, Dhesi caught him with a swift uppercut.
“I note from your biography that you do not have any experience in the Ministry of Defence per se,” said Dhesi. While noting Pocklington’s previous experience in the Treasury, housing, local government, energy security and Net Zero departments, the chair then asked him whether he thinks he “will be able to manage this huge role without that relevant knowledge in defence”.
Pocklington responded positively, citing how, for example, his Treasury and general budgetary experience is helping to move the MoD away from the ‘annual budget cycle’ to a new approach that will underpin the 10-year integrated force plan. Part of this could be the development of a Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) plus ‘other financial options’ to generate funding for defence expansion. Pocklington referred to a Treasury press statement on the topic that was released that morning.
The DSRB had been discussed earlier with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney as a method to accelerate private investment for defence spending.
In what only can be described as robust questioning from the Defence Committee, the MoD were clearly on the ropes in terms of finances and how they procure equipment and services. This was summed up by Pearce, the NAD, when he said, “One criticism that you could level at the MoD is that we do love our complexity, which does not allow you to move fast.”
The other criticism is one of over-manning. During the PAC meeting on 23 March the Chair asked why there are 14,500 people working at DE&S compared to 1,000 in the Israel Defence Forces equivalent? Where procurement, managing costs and getting defence equipment into service on time is concerned, Fred Thomas MP, a Member of the Defence Committee, noted that “the criticism from around Europe and the world is that the UK does this phenomenally badly”.
One of the major shortfalls that drives what equipment the UK MoD procures is the SDR. The latest iteration of this, which was published in 2025, provides no clear plan but merely lists aspirations and jargonises what should be a clear doctrinal mission. Jesse Norman MP, a member of the Defence Committee, pushed Pocklington and Pearce on whether there were any shortcomings in the SDR.
Pocklington opined that “the priority of being warfighting ready was central to the SDR and is fundamental to our thinking in the Department”. He said that the SDR “is the right direction of travel”, while Pearce added, “I think the strategy is absolutely the right one, but what it is doing is illustrating that we need to move at pace and that time is critical.”
Given that, since the SDR was published, Russia’s ‘grey zone’ operations have multiplied, its activities in the High North continue to grow and there is a war in the Middle East, the comments from the MoD can only be seen as extraordinary.
Norman disagreed with both Pocklington and Pearce and asserted that the SDR was now “weak”, highlighting that the UK has a shortfall in force mass and an inability to “deploy forces especially by sea, as demonstrated” [referring to the three weeks taken to deploy the Type 45 destroyer HMS Dragon to the Eastern Mediterranean and the lack of any minehunting assets in the Gulf region].’
Norman went on to highlight that the SDR emphasised a “NATO-first strategy”, but offered that the Gulf, with its impact on the energy and global financial markets, is crucial and thus not “a secondary theatre”.
The Defence Committee meeting ended with questions on the numbers of civil servants employed within the MoD – 55,000 – and the NAD – 27,000 – before AM Jones was asked about the numbers of senior RAF officers, one star and above, and whether these manning levels are being looked at.
“We will minimise whatever workforce we have in order to have the most efficient and effective workforce that we can afford to have,” Pocklington replied. “The last thing that we want is for it to be too top heavy because that is in no one’s interest.”
Nearly a week later the MoD found itself in front of the PAC, where the initial questions focused on why the Comptroller and Auditor General from the National Audit Office found “a lack of accounting records for some ongoing capital projects and a materially significant shortfall in the provisions for liabilities” to be of concern.
As the MoD’s DG Finance, Blackmore was in the ideal position to address the issue that GBP 6.1 billion (EUR 7.04 billion) was not properly accounted for. This error was evidently centred on the nuclear budget within the overall MoD budget. The former accounts for around 20% of the overall budget and, according to Pocklington, this will increase to 25% over the coming years. Asked what was causing this, he reported that, although the Dreadnought programme (which will replace the Royal Navy’s Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)) was on track, “scope changes for AUKUS and the nuclear fuels programme for defence purposes” were increasing.
As to the GBP 6.1 billion, the PAC Chair, Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, asked why this was not picked up prior to submission of the MoD accounts for auditing. Blackmore responded that the MoD “is very large and complex”. The ‘large and complex’ argument was repeated by Blackmore throughout the session, to the bafflement of most of the PAC members. At least “steps are being taken” to address the issue, she said, although, as ever, no timeframe was provided.
Moving on to “the dreaded subject of Ajax”, as the Chair described it, Lt Gen Reilly noted that during Exercise ‘Titan Storm’, held in southern England in November 2025, 33 soldiers reported medical issues in relation to operating the vehicle, with five still under medical review. She asserted, however, that if the vehicle was “maintained and operated as designed [it] presents no safety concerns”.
Lt Gen Reilly continued to say that soldiers failed to maintain the vehicles correctly on ‘Titan Storm’, but that the MoD will fit its Ajax AFVs with rubber track pads and automatic track tensioners. The fact that the MoD increased the weight of the original ASCOD vehicle from 28 to 42 tonnes had nothing to do with the vibration issues, Lt Gen Reilly claimed, while adding that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last few decades had reduced the British Army’s experience of working with tracked AFVs.
In conclusion, the overriding impression gained from these two Parliamentary Committee meetings is that the UK MoD is inefficient, over-staffed, wastes money, is complacent and in many areas incompetent. In short, and to utilise a much over-worked phrase, it is not fit for purpose.
