The US government has recently published a research document that assesses recent combat aircraft losses sustained during Operation ‘Epic Fury’. The losses themselves are only half the story. Costs, tactics, capability gaps and a reappraisal of the threat are the most important factors to be drawn from this report.
On 13 May 2026 the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) presented Congress with its report on US Aircraft Combat Losses in Operation ‘Epic Fury’. Based on open-source data that “may remain subject to revision”, the document covers fixed- and rotary-wing platforms as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and highlights that since the start of Operation ‘Epic Fury’ on 28 February 2026 US forces have lost 42 aircraft. This figure includes aircraft written off or requiring substantial repair, but all are referred to in the report as ‘combat losses’. The accuracy of the figures in the report is open to debate and will be examined later.
What is clear is that, according to Jules Hurst, the Pentagon’s Acting Comptroller, the cost of ‘Epic Fury’ is approaching USD 30 billion (EUR 25.8 billion), with a significant portion of that coming “from having a refined estimate on repair or replacement costs for equipment”.
Of the 42 highlighted combat losses, 25 are said to be UAVs, mainly MQ-9A Reapers alongside one US Navy MQ-4C Triton. The CRS said that its figure was sourced from a “news article”. The CRS figure for UAV losses is higher than that from the Aviation Safety Network, the database of which currently shows 19 US UAVs lost during the conflict.
Either way, the loss of so many MQ-9A Reapers is presenting the US military with a conundrum, given that the US Department of Defense decided to close the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc (GA-ASI) MQ-9A Reaper production line in 2025. One answer would be to replace the lost MQ-9As with the MQ-9B; according to GA-ASI’s senior director for marketing and communications, C Mark Brinkley, the MQ-9B line “is hot and running. The price will ultimately depend on what you ask for, but a full-up MQ-9B to the US is about USD 30 million, less if we slim it down.”
Although the CRS highlights the combat search and rescue (CSAR) mission for the F-15E Strike Eagle crew that ejected over Iran on 3 April in terms of the destruction of two MC-130J Commando II aircraft, the damage caused to a HH-60W Jolly Green II helicopter and the loss of an A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support aircraft, it does not mention the other aircraft destroyed or damaged during the operation. The MC-130Js were destroyed by US special forces because they could not take off. Four AH-6 Little Bird helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) were also destroyed on the ground and, surprisingly, these do not appear in the report. Ironically, this operation resonates with the US attempts to rescue US hostages from Iran in April 1980 during Operation ‘Eagle Claw’, which also saw US aircraft destroyed at a desert landing zone in Iran. ‘Eagle Claw’ ultimately led to the establishment of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the 160th SOAR.
Other possible omissions include a KC-46A Pegasus aerial refuelling aircraft that was claimed to have been written off by an Iranian missile at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. This incident was reported on pro-Iranian social media platforms as well as more widely by global media outlets. Other potential losses not contained in the report include two US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters and a US Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter destroyed at Camp Buehring in Kuwait.
Although the CRS report may be lacking some detail in respect to actual combat losses, it does air some valid wider concerns. In its summary, the “potential issues” raised include budgetary factors associated with the cost of replacing and repairing platforms. It suggests that Congress might have to alter current budgetary plans and “modify potential programming actions or supplemental appropriations, or to make adjustments to planned procurement”. In effect, the losses to date will affect future spending plans and the Pentagon’s ability to maintain its “global force posture”.
The other major factor raised by the CRS concerns tactics, techniques and procedures and, more specifically, the survivability of air platforms in a contested air environment. This particularly applies to slow-flying UAVs. Few would argue that the US administration underestimated Iran’s military air defence and ground strike capabilities and, indeed, its tenacity in pursuing its own war objectives. Clearly, the US does not ‘hold all the cards’ in this conflict.
In reporting the loss and damage of five KC-135R Stratotankers at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia during a missile and drone strike, and two further KC-135s in a mid-air collision, the report raises another concern. This is that the loss of such “high demand” assets could leave capability gaps: a salient point given the issues surrounding the KC-46 Pegasus and the demands made on the KC-135R to remain in service for longer than planned.
Air power offers politicians and military commanders alike a number of different options. The US Air Force describes the benefits of air power in its Air Force Doctrine Publication 1 as providing overall mission command; flexibility and versatility; the creation of synergistic effects; persistence; concentration; balance; and the ability to integrate cohesive, prioritised operations. Although able to provide these key benefits, air power is not a panacea, however, despite the frightening accuracy of modern air-delivered weapons.
As the US is now finding with Iran, when used against a tenacious and motivated enemy that is equipped with layered air defence systems and possesses the ability to strike US regional air bases, the costs incurred in using air power on its own might start to become prohibitive. The US may have the technological advantage that is exemplified by its weaponry, but Iran maintains the tactical whip hand.
