A BBC report has revealed that working-level talks between Denmark, Greenland and the United States are underway, focused on expanded US military basing in Greenland. Assuming the bases are developed in due course, their location could support significant boosting of US anti-submarine warfare capabilities around the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap.
Greenland’s position in NATO security has been the subject of high-level, high-profile debate across parts of the alliance over the first half of 2026 in a manner that has tested NATO’s cohesion.
What may be emerging from this, however, is a different, more detailed process that may build defence presence in Greenland to directly bolster NATO and member state security in a key region at a key time.
Greenland is a semi-autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark.
In public at least, the original, higher-level conversations centred on whether enough was being done to maximise Greenland’s geostrategic position in deterring threats from Russia and China to NATO and North American security. The position of the US Trump Administration – and most notably that of the US president himself – was that only through US ownership of Greenland could such security be guaranteed.
Driven by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European member states consequently committed to do more to build security around the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap by augmenting military deterrence presence there. This included supporting NATO’s new ‘Arctic Sentry’ activity; stood up in early February 2026, ‘Arctic Sentry’ was established to provide a regional military-operational framework around which strategic-level deterrence could be built.
The volume of the public conversations surrounding Greenland’s security faded as other issues came to the fore, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and the US/Israeli military offensive against Iran, yet the BBC has reported that serious discussions between Denmark, Greenland and the US have begun. According to the BBC report, these regular, ongoing conversations are centring on an expansion of US military basing in Greenland.
The conversations appear to be working-level discussions, involving small groups of senior diplomatic officials, and occurring with a much lower political profile. Headway is being made in the talks, the BBC noted.
The report said the US is looking to open three new military bases in southern Greenland, noting that Denmark had previously expressed willingness to support the US opening more bases there.
The new bases would “primarily focus on surveillance of potential Russian and Chinese maritime activity in … the GIUK Gap”, the report said, citing officials who had spoken to the BBC.
Although base numbers and locations are unconfirmed, the report said one likely option is Narsarsuaq: the site of a previous US military base that included a small airport. Other bases would likely also be situated at sites with existing airfield or port infrastructure.
Using in-place facilities helps reduce cost. The BBC noted that the US had more than a dozen military facilities in Greenland at the height of the Cold War. Since 1951 Denmark and the US have had a security pact in place that allows the two parties to discuss the US military presence in Greenland and also its expansion.
The one existing US facility in Greenland, Pituffik Space Force Base, is located in northwestern Greenland and is focused on monitoring missile threats coming over the North Pole region.
The GIUK Gap is often referred to as a maritime ‘chokepoint’. While the distance across it may be narrower than the broader North Atlantic, the distances between its nodes are still significant in naval operational terms. Thus, providing basing access at each node, including Greenland, helps build mass across the whole Gap.
As prescribed in NATO’s latest Alliance Maritime Strategy, published in October 2025, NATO must generate maritime power that addresses threats and challenges around a 360° axis. In this context the GIUK Gap plays a crucial geostrategic role for NATO in its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ‘face-off’ with Russia.
When seeking to deploy its Kalibr cruise missile-capable nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to optimal effect, Russia may see the Gap as both a gateway and a barrier: a gateway it must pass through to get ‘behind’ NATO forces to present that 360° challenge from the Western Atlantic; and a barrier it must close to keep US Navy (USN) ‘heavy metal’ at arm’s length in the North Atlantic so that US SSNs cannot prevent Russian boats in the Norwegian and lower Barents seas from threatening northern European NATO targets ashore and at sea.
Basing locations in Southern Greenland would enable the US to build dedicated airfield and port support, respectively, for USN (and allies’) maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) and SSNs, facilitating the generation of more sustained ASW presence around the GIUK Gap.
MPAs and SSNs are key tools in the ASW tool-kit. MPAs provide an initial layer, bringing wide-area surveillance to search for targets and then speed to reach an area quickly. SSNs, meanwhile, provide focused, localised capability to hunt a particular target in a particular area.
Basing in Southern Greenland would also help complete a chain of NATO MPA and SSN operational support infrastructure that is now extending from east to west across the North Atlantic, enabling the alliance to generate a sustainable, region-wide ASW barrier.
With Norway and the UK among several NATO operators of the USN’s P-8A Poseidon MPA, adding US air-basing in southern Greenland would mean NATO has a ring of P-8 bases stretching from Norway (several facilities), to the UK (Lossiemouth), to Iceland (Keflavik) and then potentially on to Greenland.
In February 2026 the US approved a P-8 sale to Denmark as well, inviting the prospect of the Royal Danish Air Force operating P-8s from Greenland in future.
Regarding SSNs, USN submarine command staffs have for some time been focused on securing the Western Atlantic against Kalibr-capable Russian SSNs pushing through the GIUK Gap to threaten North American targets, so the USN possessing more capacity to pressure that threat from the western end of the Gap has security benefits at a national level.
At the NATO level, meanwhile, alliance SSNs can already access an expanding range of support ports across that same east-west axis, from Norway (Grotsund, near Tromsø in the north, and Haakonsvern/Bergen further south), to the UK (Faslane), then to the Faroe Islands (Tórshavn), and Iceland (Grundartangi, near Reykjavik). Access in Greenland would complete this chain.
Forward support is extremely important for SSN operations. It enables boats to remain on station, generating output in areas of interest for longer periods rather than conducting long transits to and from the area.
A third key part of the ASW tool-kit are specialist frigates carrying both towed-array sonars and organic helicopters (bringing sonobuoys and dipping sonars). In the North Atlantic NATO’s primary pool for such capability is Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1), which covers the High North down to the GIUK Gap and across to the eastern Baltic. It often divides its frigates between these areas, but the ships spend significant time in transit. New basing facilities in Greenland would enable SNMG1 ASW frigates to also stay on station longer.
