Despite being a perennial problem child for the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ajax programme is unlikely to be cancelled. This largely comes down to a combination of sunk cost, lack of available funding or time to source an alternative, the impact that cancellation would have on other critical programmes, alongside moves made by the MoD.
The British Army’s long-troubled Ajax tracked vehicle programme endured further scandal and setback in November-December 2025, following multiple reports of soldiers working with the vehicles receiving noise and vibration-related injuries during Operation Iron Fist and Operation Titan Storm. Newspaper reports were followed by a flurry of anonymous leaks on social media, from numerous current or former serving personnel, members of industry, and civil service personnel, all highlighting deficiencies with the vehicle family and the running of the programme.
Collectively, this put the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) into the embarrassing position of having to review its decision to declare initial operating capability (IOC) just weeks prior on 6 November 2025, and then formally withdraw IOC status on 28 January 2026.
Amid the negative publicity, the programme’s ultimate fate has been the subject of widespread speculation, with calls for cancellation being quite commonplace. Yet a cold, hard look at the programme suggests it probably remains ‘condemned to succeed’, largely for structural reasons going far beyond the vehicle itself.
For starters, speaking to multiple serving personnel, MoD officials, and UK defence insiders over the past several years, has yielded a running theme: ‘There’s no money.’ According to a report in The Times, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), briefed Prime Minister Keir Starmer in December 2025 that the MoD is facing a GBP 28 billion funding shortfall out to 2030, even despite government plans to boost spending. This goes some way to explaining why the publication of the long-awaited defence investment plan (DIP) has been delayed multiple times, with latest estimates by insiders pointing to a publication date sometime in March 2026, and some bleaker predictions suggesting publication could be delayed even further.
As such, cancelling Ajax and restarting procurement would be estimated to cost the MoD billions; crucially these are billions it currently does not have. Moreover, cancellation would require the MoD to publicly explain why it has spent over GBP 5 billion so far on procuring Ajax, with nothing to show for it. Under the current government, which has racked up around 15 policy U-turns at the time of writing, it is difficult to imagine such a bold move being taken.
With few resources to waste, cancellation would therefore have required finding a way to save face and recoup some of their losses. In this vein, previous discussions with MoD insiders revealed that the Army was examining the option of selling their Ajax fleet to recoup some of their losses, with candidates under consideration including eastern European players such as Poland and Romania, along with the Baltic states. Evidently though, they were unable to find any takers, which is fairly unsurprising considering the very public and extensively documented nature of Ajax’s troubles. With no obvious way to recoup the money spent, the MoD does not find itself with a wealth of options going forward.
Over the course of February 2026, several figures in government, including PM Starmer, and Armed forces Minister Al Carns have indicated that the UK’s defence spending may see a boost relatively soon. However, unless this boost amounts to significantly more than the GBP 28 billion required just to cover the existing funding shortfall out to 2030, not much is expected to materially change.
Worse still, a forecast based on the MoD’s February 2026 figures published by the Financial Times suggest that on its current trajectory, the UK will spend 2.13% of GDP on ‘core’ defence funding in 2027, missing its target of 2.6% that year by quite a wide margin. This is not a promising sign for the country’s defence spending commitments. Lest we forget, on 25 June 2025 at NATO’s The Hague Summit, the UK alongside its allies committed to spending 3.5% of GDP on “core defence requirements” by 2035.
Second, Ajax is a critical component of the UK’s ‘Project Asgard’, to build a digital reconnaissance and strike network (otherwise known as a sensor-to-shooter system) enabling fires to be remotely directed at targets located by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and therefore greatly cutting down the time required to complete the sensor-to-shooter cycle. Ajax forms a key component of this, since it is intended to be the Army’s primary reconnaissance vehicle. Asgard’s importance to the Army’s future plans for how it will fight should not be understated; speaking with Army insiders, the characterisation of the programme has often been: ‘Project Asgard is going to save us all’. While a bit tongue-in-cheek, the programme is treated very seriously as a key pillar of the Army’s future capability. Cancelling Ajax would therefore put a critical component of Project Asgard on hold, delaying the Army’s implementation of the new way it wants to fight.
Now, one could argue that since Ajax isn’t operable today, part of Asgard’s implementation is de facto on hold anyway. Additionally, there may be some scope for the Army to make progress on Asgard without Ajax. However, none of the alternatives appear to be as straightforward or cheap as simply making Ajax work.
There is a diplomatic dimension to this as well; the standing of the UK armed forces among allies largely depends on what they can bring to the table. At a time when many allies are raising their military spending and embarking on ambitious modernisation programmes, delaying Asgard would risk the UK being left behind compared to its peers, and perceived as an antiquated force by its allies.
Lastly, two recent moves from the MoD would seem to be telegraphing its future intent.
First is the removal of Chris Bowbrick, the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for the Ajax programme, from this role (with the Financial Times reporting he will take on a new role elsewhere within the MoD). This reads like the MoD offering a proverbial ‘pound of flesh’ to appease critics, since it’s fair to say the programme’s troubles were a group effort. If the entire programme were truly on the verge of cancellation, it is difficult to see what Bowbrick’s removal from post was supposed to achieve. On a similar note, if MoD leadership truly believed Ajax’s failures were down to Bowbrick’s leadership, then why keep him around?
Second is the 22 January 2026 statement by Lord Vernon Coaker, a Minister of State for the MoD, that oversight for the Ajax programme has passed to the National Armaments Director (NAD) Group, taking over from the Army. Again, if the programme were on the verge of cancellation, this would seem a rather pointless exercise. The move also makes Bowbrick’s removal from post seem even more symbolic, because with NAD Group taking over management of Ajax from the Army, presumably the post of SRO Ajax was likely to pass to a new candidate as a matter of course under the new structure. If so, it would mean Bowbrick was essentially pushed out of a job which he would have had to give up regardless.
Taken together, these moves suggest that the MoD is laying the groundwork to continue the programme. Rhetorically, they can now argue that they have sacked the person responsible, and have given responsibility of programme to a different branch. Whether or not these changes will lead to meaningful progress remains to be seen.
Finally, a further hint that the MoD is preparing to continue with Ajax came on 19 February 2026, when in response to a written question on Ajax, Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry Luke Pollard stated “on current plans, Full Operating Capability for the Armoured Cavalry Programme is still expected to be achieved by the end of 2029.”
Further clarification is expected upon publication of the DIP. However, with DIP publication also facing delays, it may be some time before the MoD provides a clear answer. However, based on current information, it is difficult to see the MoD pulling the trigger on Ajax.
