Since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Starlink satellite network has delivered far more than just an internet connection in the field for the Ukrainian armed forces: SpaceX’s satellite terminal has now become the central communication artery for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control, reconnaissance and combat operations.

While classic GPS signals have been disrupted and spoofed by electronic warfare (EW) systems for years, making navigation at the front increasingly unreliable, the Starlink connection was long considered comparatively robust.

Unlike GPS satellites at an altitude of around 20,000 km, Starlink satellites occupy low Earth orbits of only about 550 km and, with thousands of satellites constantly changing, a single interference signal is hardly able to permanently disrupt the entire connection.

Although local outages of individual connections are theoretically possible, Starlink is considered a particularly reliable communications network due its the sheer number of satellites. It was precisely this technological advantage that has enabled Ukraine to conduct far-reaching drone operations deep within the Russian hinterland.

Russia’s answer to Starlink

The first Russian attempts to disrupt Starlink date back to 2023. Leaked US intelligence documents at the time revealed months of testing with the Tobol system, which was originally developed to protect Russian satellites from Western interference and was later repurposed for attacks on Starlink.

It is widely believed that Russia is responsible for a large number of GPS malfunctions over the Baltic Sea, thus disrupting shipping and air traffic. The 14Ts227 Tobol radar stationed in Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg) may have played a significant role in this.

The real technological leap for Russia’s counter-Starlink capabilities, however, came with the Kalinka system. According to the Russian state news agency TASS, Kalinka is being developed by the Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies (CBST).

Unlike traditional jammers that flood entire frequency bands with raw transmission power, Kalinka relies on a passive operating principle. The system receives and analyses the so-called uplink signals – that is, the radio signals that a Starlink terminal on the ground sends to the satellite.

Because Kalinka itself emits hardly any signals of its own, it is significantly harder for enemy reconnaissance to locate than conventional jammers. Its real benefit, however, lies not in directly blocking or disrupting the connection, but in defining the precise location of terminals – for example, on board unmanned boats or UAVs. These can then be targeted and attacked.

‘Big gun’ – Volna Kupol Garant

A second system, which appeared during the war in 2026, is much more visible: the Volna Kupol Garant system from manufacturer Russkiy Kupol. This system, which in some Ukrainian reports is also referred to as ‘Peresvet-M’, is a classic, powerful jamming device.

According to the manufacturer’s statements to TASS, the system does not target the connection between the drone and the satellite, but directly the satellite itself; it floods its receiver with such a strong interference signal in the 14–14.5 GHz frequency band that it can no longer filter out the actual signals from the ground terminals.

The system uses trailers equipped with two satellite antennas. It tracks the position of the Starlink satellite and transmits a strong signal that disrupts terminal communication in an area of ​​up to 20 km². Figuratively speaking, the satellite is bombarded with ‘noise’ so that it can no longer understand actual communications. The cost per unit is estimated at approximately EUR 1.65 million.

However, the strength of the jamming signal from the Volna Kupol Garant system is also the system’s biggest drawback. SpaceX, as operator of the Starlink satellites, can detect deliberate interference relatively quickly and easily. Using other satellites, the source of the jamming signal can then be located.

The Ukrainian counter-strategy: attack

Ukraine knows how to use this data. In June 2026 it reportedly destroyed one of these systems. Drone footage released at the time showed a configuration of six structures. Satellite images near Kerch in Crimea show a configuration of eight trailers (see above).

The inevitably high transmission power of the Volna Kupol Garant system makes the Starlink jammer an attractive, easily locatable target for Ukrainian electronic reconnaissance. According to Ukrainian statements, their units – such as the 422nd Air Force Regiment for Unmanned Systems, part of the ground forces – have already located and destroyed several Volna Kupol Garant systems, some within hours of their activation.

This dynamic – powerful but easily locatable jamming systems versus precise reconnaissance and attack UAVs – has developed into its own tactical cat-and-mouse game: as soon as a new system is deployed, the search for its position begins.

Communication advantage with an expiration date?

The Starlink example illustrates a pattern that has repeated itself throughout the Ukraine war: technological superiority rarely lasts. Every new capability provokes a countermeasure within months, which in turn necessitates a new response.

The Kalinka and Volna Kupol Garant systems are just two components of a Russian programme working to undermine Ukraine’s once virtually unassailable communications advantage. The next stage of evolution could be reached if the Russians succeed in integrating Volna Kupol Garant capabilities into smaller, more mobile units.

What’s also remarkable about the Ukrainian-Russian back and forth is that the technology is not confined to the Ukrainian war zone. Analysts suspect that Tehran deployed an experimental version of the Kalinka system in January 2026 during nationwide protests to suppress the Starlink-based communications of the Iranian protest movement.

While this has not been confirmed, it would demonstrate how quickly military jamming technology can find its way into entirely different contexts. Moreover, it would only be logical: Ukraine also supplies its drone defence technology to the Middle East, where Arab countries use it against Iranian Shahed attack UAVs.

For the defence of Ukraine, the current development of Russian jamming technology means that the current advantage is not a law of nature, but the result of a constant race: a race that is far from over.